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Benchmark Legislation:
A Measured Approach in the Fight Against
Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals
ADAM POWELL*
Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is unique in the field of counterfeiting because criminals
only attempt to copy the appearance of a drug, not its actual effect. Because such
counterfeit drugs are cheap to make and ineffective or dangerous, counterfeiters see
immense profits without regard for the potential for injury or death. Furthermore, the
complexity of distribution channels and lax penalties result in little risk for criminals.
One potential tool to address this problem is an electronic pedigree system that would
track shipments of drugs and reduce the opportunity for counterfeiters to infiltrate the
supply chain. Unfortunately, such a system is years away from being effectively
implemented. To compound the problem, soaring drug prices and a dwindling
economy have led to calls for free importation from countries that have less expensive
drugs. Yet many of those countries have counterfeit problems of their own.
Because of the risk to human life, safety must take priority over efforts to reduce costs.
The best solution to pharmaceutical counterfeiting is a single bill that attacks the
problem in steps that are implemented when certain objective criteria are met. First,
criminal sanctions should be increased to at least match those of illicit drug trafficking.
Next, e-pedigree should be implemented when technology advances to the point that it
is affordable and reliable. Finally, once safety is assured, the bill should reconsider
reimportation plans.
* Research Fellow, Law & Bioscience Project; J.D. Candidate, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, 2oio; B.S., Chemical Engineering, University of California, Santa
Barbara, 2007. I would like to thank Professor Robin Feldman of U.C. Hastings and Antoinette
Konski of Foley & Lardner, LLP, for advising me on this Note. I would also like to thank the editors
and staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their work on this Note.
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INTRODUCTION
Counterfeiting has moved beyond unsophisticated attempts to
replicate expensive brand-name jewelry or sunglasses; it has become a
sophisticated criminal enterprise that poses a global threat to industry
profits and health alike. Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is unique because
counterfeiters often only attempt to copy the appearance of a drug, not
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its actual effects.' They do not try to copy the effect because it is much
more profitable to copy the drug's appearance and packaging using
whatever materials are available, regardless of their danger.2 Thus,
counterfeit pharmaceuticals often contain the wrong or no active
ingredients, or are contaminated by additional toxic chemicals or poor
sterilization practices.3 This creates drugs that are either ineffective at
treating disease or cause additional injury. As a result, counterfeiters
cause more damage in the realm of pharmaceuticals than in more
traditionally counterfeited products. In addition to health concerns, the
effect on the pharmaceutical industry is a decrease in profits and brand
credibility, which results in a disincentive to research and ultimately cure
disease.4
Experts have proposed a number of ideas to reduce the amount of
counterfeit drugs entering the U.S. market. One of the most discussed
options is the electronic pedigree system, which would provide electronic
tracking of drug shipments and help address counterfeits entering the
supply chain.5 Unfortunately, the technology is not yet advanced enough
to provide reliable, safe, and affordable implementation. Further
complicating the situation, there is political pressure to open up
importation of drugs to reduce consumer costs.' Opening up importation
may reduce prices for consumers, but at the cost of importing counterfeit
drugs from other sources. Safety should be the primary concern because
of the dangers counterfeits pose. Accordingly, we should first ensure the
safe delivery of genuine pharmaceuticals to consumers. Technology
permitting, e-pedigree will further guarantee safety. Then, and only then,
should we consider opening up importation to reduce consumer costs.
This Note will address the dangers of pharmaceutical counterfeiting
and why current legislation is premature, and will propose legislation
I. Antoinette Konski, IP Strategies to Combat Distribution of Counterfeit Drugs, BIOPROCESS INT'L,
Mar. 2008, at 14, available at http://www.bioprocessintl.com/multimedia/archive/ooo76/BPIA-
080603AR02_O 76588a.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Walt Bogdanich & Jane Hooker, From China to Panama, a Trail of Poisoned
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2oo7, at i.
3. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Consumer Education: Counterfeit Medicine, http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/CounterfeitMedicine/
ucmlo6262.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
4. JULIAN MORRIS & PHILIP STEVENS, INT'L POLICY NETWORK, COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES IN LEss
DEVELOPED NATIONS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 5 (2oo6), http://www.fightingdiseases.org/pdflipn-
counterfeit.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Suchira Ghosh, Note, The R.ELD. Act of 2oo6 and E-Pedigrees: Tackling the
Problem of Counterfeit Drugs in the United States Wholesale Industry, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 577, 578 (20o7).
6. Id. at 591-97-
7. See Press Release, Byron Dorgan, U.S. Senator of N.D., Senators Predict Drug Importation
Bill will Finally Pass Congress (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://dorgan.senate.gov/newsroom/
record.cfm?id=306488.
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that includes benchmark clauses which limit implementation of
premature projects until the achievement of certain objective standards.
Part I will discuss the dangers of counterfeit drugs, how those drugs
make their way into the legitimate market, and why counterfeiting is
such a lucrative business. Part II will discuss why current legislation,
including the e-pedigree system and bills similar to the Dorgan Bill, is
premature. Finally, Part III will discuss why a plan based on objective
"benchmarks" is the best way to approach the problem.
1. THE COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICAL CRISIS
In recent years, the pharmaceutical industry has ballooned in size,
with sales soaring to $291 billion in 2008,8 doubling the $145 billion sold
in 2000.9 As a result, the industry has become an increasingly attractive
target for criminal enterprises focused on counterfeit drugs. In 2005, the
World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that the global market for
counterfeit and substandard drugs was worth $35 billion per year. o
Furthermore, the Center for Medicines in the Public Interest estimated
that the counterfeit market might reach $75 billion per year by 2010."
WHO authorities estimate that, of the global pharmaceutical industry,
more than ten percent of drugs are counterfeit."
A. DANGERS To HUMAN HEALTH
The WHO defines "pharmaceutical counterfeiting" to include
counterfeiting, tampering, and diversion.13  Under the general
"counterfeiting" label, the WHO includes "drugs that are deliberately
mislabeled as to identity and/or source; which may contain correct or
incorrect ingredients, no active ingredients, insufficient active
ingredients, or fake packaging." 4 Tampering "is a criminal manipulation
8. Press Release, IMS Health Inc., IMS Health Reports U.S. Prescription Sales Grew 1.3
Percent in 2oo8 to $291 Billion (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.imshealth.com/portall
site/imshealth/menuitem.o103f29C72c419cd88f6i 109418c22al?vgnextoid=4ia679oob55a51 xioVgnVCM
Ioooo718I2ca2RCRD&vgnextfmt=default (follow "IMS Health Reports U.S. Prescription Sales
Grew 1.3 Percent in 2oo8 to $291 Billion" hyperlink).
9. Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reports 14.9 Percent Growth in US Prescription
Sales to $145 Billion in 2ooo (May 31, 2oo), available at http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/
imshealth/menuitem.a46c6d4df3db4b3d88f61Io19418c22a/?vgnextoid=Ic28rd3be7a29IioVgnVCMioo
ooo71812ca2RCRD&vgnextchannel=41a679oob55a5iroVgnVCMioooo7812ca2RCRD&vgnextfmt=
default.
io. WHO/Western Pacific Region, Counterfeit Medicines: Some Frequently Asked Questions
(May 6,2005), http://www.wpro.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs_20050506.htm.
ii. Peter Pitts, President, Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, Counterfeit Drugs and
China (May 31, 2oo6), http://www.cmpi.org/in-the-news/testimony/counterfeit-drugs-and-china-new/.
12. WHO/Western Pacific Region, supra note 10.
13. WHO, COUNTERFEIT DRUGs: GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES TO COMBAT
COUNTFERFErr DRUGS 8 (1999), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.intfhq/x999/WHOEDMQSM_99..pdf.
I34. Id.
[Vol. 61:749752
A MEASURED APPROACH
of a pharmaceutical by an unauthorized party," including manufacturing
drugs that are diluted and sold at higher profits." Finally, diversion is
defined as "the criminal importation and resale of pharmaceuticals
intended for another country," typically by diverting pharmaceuticals
destined for third-world relief efforts to developed nations at marked-up
prices.'
Counterfeiters typically target the most popular drugs such as
antibiotics." However, counterfeit drugs have surfaced in distribution
channels to treat illnesses "including malaria, AIDS, tuberculosis, fungal
infections, bacterial infections, cancer, high cholesterol, erectile
dysfunction, pain, and flu," in addition to "counterfeit vitamins, steroids,
and hormones."'" Counterfeiters thrive in environments with little
regulation, rampant corruption, and/or weak law enforcement. 9 In the
developing world, "counterfeit pharmaceuticals can range up to seventy
percent of the entire drug market."20 One disturbing example is the
extent to which glycerin, a syrup used in cough and cold medicine, is
replaced with ethylene glycol or diethylene glycol, which are toxic
ingredients used in antifreeze."' Counterfeiters reap vast profits by
replacing glycerin with much cheaper ingredients without regard to the
end result.22 In Panama, 365 people died as a result of ingesting cough
syrup that contained diethylene glycol." More than 1oo children died in
Nigeria24 and over eighty children died in Haiti after taking similar
medications that were adulterated with poisonous solvents." In 2001, the
Shenzhen Evening News reported that "an estimated 192,00o Chinese
people died in 2001 due to fake pharmaceuticals."26
While most cases of counterfeit pharmaceuticals are reported in
developing nations, counterfeiters have also infiltrated the U.S. market.
In 2004, CooperVision, Inc. announced that counterfeit versions of its
15. Amy M. Bunker, Deadly Dose: Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property and Human
Health, 89J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 493, 495 (2007).
16. Id.
17. WHO, Regional Office for the Western Pacific, Counterfeit Drugs (Nov. 2003), http://
www.wpro.who.int/media centre/factsheets/fs_20031 ICounterfeit+drugs.htm.
18. Bunker, supra note 15, at 496.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 497.
21. Bogdanich & Hooker, supra note 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Global Pharma Health Fund 2004, Cruel Reality: Examples of Medicine Counterfeiting,
http://www.gphf org/web/en/minilab/hintergrund-arzneimittelfaelschungen.htm#Beispiele.
25. Douglas W. Stearn, Deterring the Importation of Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Products, 59
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 537, 540 (2004); Bogdanich & Hooker, supra note 2.
26. Bunker, supra note 55, at 497 (citing Peter S. Goodman, China's Killer Headache: Fake
Pharmaceuticals, WASH. PosT, Aug. 30, 2002, at Ax).
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contact lenses were found in the United States. In 2003, authorities in
the United States recalled 130,ooo bottles of Lipitor, one of the world's
best selling drugs, after discovering at least 30,ooo of the bottles were
counterfeit."
B. How Do COUNTERFEIT DRUGs ENTER THE MARKET?
The previous section discussed the dangers of counterfeit
pharmaceuticals and the profound effect both internationally and
domestically. This portion of the Note discusses the two major sources of
counterfeit drugs: the "gray market" and internet pharmacies.
i. The "Gray Market"
Of the pharmaceuticals imported into America, about ninety
percent "move from the manufacturer to large wholesalers and then
directly to pharmacies."" The market is dominated by the big three
wholesalers: Amerisource Bergen, Cardinal Health, and McKesson
Corporation.0 However, the secondary "gray market", which is highly
vulnerable to counterfeits, represents the other ten percent." The "gray
market" represents thousands of interactions between smaller
wholesalers and provides the perfect opportunity for criminals to
infiltrate the supply chain." Additionally, the "big three" are not immune
to counterfeit drugs because they "sometimes buy back drugs from the
smaller secondary wholesalers to cover short-term shortages." 33
Additionally, pharmacies and smaller wholesalers often sell bulk product
among themselves in cases of excess or impending expiration.' Each stop
is an opportunity for criminals to infiltrate the supply chain with
counterfeits.
The "gray market" causes even more problems abroad, particularly
in the European Union, where principals of free movement mandate that
"no country within the EU may place legal, legislative, or other barriers
preventing trade between members, nor may an owner of a trademark
use its rights to prevent repackaging of the medicinal product if the
27. Press Release, CooperVision Singapore, CooperVision Announces Counterfeit Product
Found in Unauthorized US Distribution (Oct. 15, 2004), available at http://www.coopervision.com/
singapore/patient aboutusnews.asp?id=22.
28. See Rome Neal, Lipitor Counterfeits Abound, CBS NEWS, June 5, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2003/o6/o4/earlyshow/health/main557016.shtml.
29. Bryan A. Liang, Fade to Black: Importation and Counterfeit Drugs, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 279,
287 (2oo6).
30. Bernadine Healy, Mean-Street Medicine, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 16, 2005, at 56.
31. Liang, supra note 29, at 287 (citing Jeff Siegel, Secondary Wholesalers: The Ghost in the
Machine, PHARM. Com., Dec. 27, 2005, available at http://www.pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/
frontEnd/maln.php?idSeccion=2 24).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 288.
34. Id
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repackaging will not adversely affect the original condition of the
product."" The result is an immensely complicated distribution chain
where drugs can pass between tens or hundreds of parties before
reaching the final consumer.
2. Internet Pharmacies
In addition to the "gray market," U.S. consumers are exposed to
counterfeit drugs through less reputable pharmacies, including many
internet pharmacies. Experts estimate that internet pharmacies
accounted for an estimated $15 to $20 billion in annual sales in 20042
Compounding the problem, eighty-five percent of those websites do not
require a prescription." Companies that do not require a prescription to
dispense pharmaceuticals will likely have few qualms dispensing
dangerous counterfeit versions. While legitimate internet pharmacies
pose less of a risk, illegitimate pharmacies exist outside the realm of
legislative protection and import drugs to unsuspecting customers. Many
of those companies advertise as if they are located in the United States
or Canada.3 However, a study for the FDA found that, of ii,ooo sites
claiming to be Canadian pharmacies, 39  only ioo9 actually sold
prescription drugs, and only 214 of those were registered to a Canadian
entity.40 Furthermore, "products that are not earmarked for domestic
consumption" in a country are not required to pass those countries'
health and safety laws. 4 ' As a result, pharmaceuticals that are imported to
Canada and illegally imported into the United States via an internet
pharmacy do not have to pass either country's health safety laws. 41
35. Id. at 291 (citing COMM'N OF TiE EUROPEAN CMTYS., COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON
PARALLEL IMPORTS OF PROPRIETARY MEDICINAL PRODUCTS FOR WHICH MARKETING AUTHORISATIONS
HAVE ALREADY BEEN GRANTED 3 (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pharmaceuticals/
eudralex/vol-I/com_2003-839/com 2003_839 en.pdf).
36. Brian A. Liang & Tim Mackey, Searching for Safety: Addressing Search Engine, Website, and
Provider Accountability for Illicit Online Drug Sales, 35 Am. J.L. & MED. 125, 128 (2009) (citing
Stephanie Y. Crawford, Internet Pharmacy: Issues of Access, Quality, Cost, and Regulation, 27 J. MED.
SYST. 57, 58 (2003); Amy J. Oliver, Internet Pharmacies: Regulation of a Growing Industry, 28 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 98, 98 (2000)).
37. See id. (citing NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., "YOU'VE
GoT DRUGS!" V: PRESCRIPTION DRUG PUSHERS ON THE INTERNET 8 (2008), available at http://
www.casacolumbia.org/articlefiles/531-2oo8% 20You% 27ve% 2oGot% 2oDrugs% 20V.pdf).
38. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, FDA Casts Suspicions on Online Pharmacies, SEATTLE TIMES, June
15, 2005, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2oo2336462_fdal5.html.
39. Jeff Clabaugh, Survey Finds Few Online Pharmacies Sell Drugs, WASH. Bus. J., June 13, 2005,
http://www.bizjournals.com/lwashington/stories/2o5/o6/13/daily3.html.
40. Id.; Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 38.
41. Liang, supra note 29, at 310.
42. See id.
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C. RISK AND REWARD
The previous section of this Note discussed the complicated
methods criminals use to ship counterfeit drugs to consumers. This
portion discusses why the pharmaceutical industry is such an attractive
target to counterfeiters. Drug counterfeiters go to such lengths to
infiltrate the supply chain because the industry promises immense
profits, little risk of being caught, and low penalties if convicted.
Generally, criminals will choose to distribute drugs with the highest
pricing ratio- the ratio of the drug's sale price to the drug's marginal
cost.43 Intriguingly, some assert that this is a result of our intellectual
property system itself."
To recoup research and development costs, patented brand-name
drugs are sold at very high pricing ratios.45 While it is impossible to know
the average marginal cost of producing brand-name drugs, it is always "a
small fraction of the commercial price."46 For example, in the United
States, an annual supply of the anti-HIV medication Trizivir is over
$12,ooo.47 Without the research and development costs for producing
brand-name pharmaceuticals, generic companies are able to sell the same
drug for less than $200 per year in other countries.4' The result is a
"pricing ratio" of at least 6o:i for that particular drug.49 Cocaine, by
comparison, has a pricing ratio of 25:1.50 Consider, also, that these prices
are for manufacturing a pharmaceutically effective drug." Targeting the
pharmaceutical industry is even more profitable because most
counterfeiters use substandard or ineffective materials that are less
expensive.
Counterfeiting a drug, without infringing a trademark, is punishable
by at most three years in prison and often no jail time at all." Other
countries have similarly weak criminal punishments. For example, in the
43. See id. at 537-38.
44. Kevin Outterson & Ryan Smith, Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 16 ALB.
L.J. Sci. & TECH- 525, 537-40 (2oo6).
45. See Bunker, supra note 15, at 507.
46. Outterson & Smith, supra note 44, at 537.
47. Id. (citing Drugstore.com, Trizivir, http://www.drugstore.com/pharmacy/prices/drugprice.asp?ndc-=
00173069ioo&trx=1Z5oo6 (last visited Jan. 12, 2010)).
48. Id. (citing MtDECINs SANS FRONTILRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING
GUiDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVs FOR DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs 9 (8th ed. 2oo5), available at http://
www.msfaccess.org/fileadmin/user upload/diseases/hiv-aids(Untanglng-the Web/untanglngtheweb%2o8.pdf).
49. Id. at 538.
50. Id. at 539.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 540.
53. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2oo6). By contrast, if criminals knowingly infringe a trademark
while trafficking counterfeit drugs, they face up to ten years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 232o(a)(L): see
also Bryan A. Liang, Structurally Sophisticated or Lamentably Limited? Mechanims to Ensure Safety
of the Medicine Supply, x6 ALB. L.J. Sco. & TECH. 483, 495 (2006).
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A MEASURED APPROACH
European Union, Allen Valentine, who was responsible for an immense
counterfeit operation throughout Europe and was convicted fourteen
times on charges of medication fraud, received a sentence of only five
and a half years.54 In Latin America, illicit substance manufacture and
sale is punishable by ten to fifteen years if caught, but production of fake
pharmaceuticals results in less than six months of jail time, and often
perpetrators are released within days of making bail.
Why would a criminal risk ten to fifteen years in prison for a 25:1
pricing ratio, when they can risk less than six months in prison for a more
than 6o:i pricing ratio? They don't. Because of the great penalties for
making illegal drugs, some criminals have shifted production to the much
more lucrative, less risky, counterfeit pharmaceutical market. 6 For
example, two former convicted cocaine traffickers, Domingo Gonzalez
and Julio Cruz, were caught leading a multi-million dollar counterfeit
ring responsible for the sale of at least four million cholesterol medicine
tablets with sales exceeding $io million."
II. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE DEBATE
Part I discussed the dangers of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, how
they enter the legitimate supply line, and why criminals find the
counterfeit drug market so appealing. In addition to counterfeit drug
problems, Congress is constantly looking for ways to reduce
pharmaceutical prices for consumers. Unfortunately, these two goals
often conflict. Part II described two such conflicting proposals being
discussed in Congress: the electronic pedigree system and reimportation
bills such as the Dorgan Bill." Electronic pedigree systems provide
sophisticated tracking devices on drugs or shipments of drugs that
theoretically reduce the opportunity for counterfeiters to infiltrate the
system." The Dorgan Bill was one of many plans to allow reimportation
of drugs from other countries to reduce consumer costs.t While the
Dorgan Bill was recently defeated, similar bills will surely follow. 6'
54. Sam Lister, The £6m Secret Factory that Churned Out Thousands of Fake Viagra Tablets, TIMES
(London), Nov. 27, 2004, at 9, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uklarticle395984.ece.
55. Liang, supra note 29, at 286 (citing Kerry Capell et al., What's in That Pill? In Latin America,
Fake Drugs Are as Lucrative as Cocaine, BUSINESSWEEK, June 18, 20oo, http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/oI_25/b3737153.htm).
56. Id. at 286-87.
57. Id. at 287.
58. Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, S. 525, 1IITH Cong. (2009).
59. See infra Part I.B.
6o. See, e.g., Press Release, Byron Dorgan, U.S. Senator of N.D., Dorgan, Snowe, McCain,
Stabenow Introduce Bipartisan Prescription Drug Importation Bill (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://
dorgan.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=309o7 1.
6'. See Phil Taylor, Dorgan Bill Defeated, but Drug Importation Is Not Dead, Says White House,
SECURING PHARMA, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.securingpharma.conil4oarticles/336.php.
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Unfortunately, these proposals fail to address the dangers of
counterfeit pharmaceuticals. Electronic pedigree systems are expensive
and unreliable,62 and the free importation of pharmaceuticals would
expose us to additional risks from countries with their own counterfeit
problems. With a continually worsening economy and growing
prescription drug costs, many look to the free importation of
pharmaceuticals as a quick fix.63 However, until we implement adequate
safety measures, we should not even consider importation. Cheaper
pharmaceuticals will only help patients if they are safe and effective.
A. OPENING UP IMPORTATION-THE DORGAN BILL
For years, several Senators have attempted to pass a bill that would
open up drug importation from other countries with government-
controlled prices.64 The Dorgan Bill was designed with the noble purpose
of reducing prescription drug costs, which are often prohibitively high for
some consumers.6 5 The Bill would have allowed importation from a
number of countries, including Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
Switzerland, and the Euroean Union.6 President Obama originally
supported drug importation, later agreed not to pursue importing drugs
from Canada or Europe,68 and has finally pledged his support for drug
importation, despite the Dorgan Bill's defeat.
While the Bill provided many local safeguards, it failed to address
the fact that many of the importing countries have their own counterfeit
drug problems. Studies have suggested that many of the proposed
countries in the Bill have significant counterfeit problems. 0 For example,
Japan was one of the "top io countries where counterfeit drugs were
most frequently seized or discovered in 2oo8."' Furthermore, the WHO
estimated that more than twenty percent of the pharmaceuticals in the
former Soviet Republic are counterfeit.72 Many of those counterfeit drug
problems are a result of free importation and exportation of
pharmaceuticals within those countries." Supporters may argue that the
62. See infra Part II.B.
63. Press Release, Byron Dorgan, supra note 6o.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Liang, supra note 29, at 299.
67. Tom Hamburger, White House Gives Drug Makers a Seat, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, at Ai.
68. Id.
69. See Taylor, supra note 6i.
70. Those countries include Austria, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Japan, and the United Kingdom. See Thomas T. Kubic, Dangerous Assumptions
Drawn From List of Permitted Countries (July 9, 2009), http://www.safemedicines.org/2009/o7/dangerous-
assumptions-drawn-from-list-of-permnitted-countries.html.
71. Id.
7 2. Id.
73. See Liang, supra note 29, at 299.
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Bill required the imported drug to have a detailed pedigree. However, as
discussed below, neither written nor electronic pedigrees are sufficient to
protect American consumers because they can be tampered with and
they fail to close all the gaps in the supply chain.?
Bills similar to the Dorgan Bill may someday contribute to greatly
reducing pharmaceutical costs, but we currently have too many problems
with counterfeit drugs to endorse a bill that could add to security
concerns without providing any meaningful protection. For now, the
legislature should focus on actions that will secure current and future
drug distribution channels before rushing into legislation that could put
us in the same situation as other countries plagued by drug
counterfeiting.
B. "E-PEDIGREE" Is NOT A PANACEA AND WILL ONLY CREATE A FALSE
SENSE OF SECURITY
In 1987, Congress implemented the Prescription Drug Marketing
Act," which required many drugs to have a "pedigree," which is a
statement recording all the transactions of a drug throughout the supply
line." However, such traditional pedigrees are of limited use because
they are easily forged. As a result, many suggest that an electronic
pedigree ("e-pedigree") system is the solution?8 E-pedigree systems
track drugs using either a radio frequency identification (RFID) system
or barcodes.79
RFID systems typically consist of a reader, a database, and a tag
containing a silicon chip and antenna.o RFID systems can typically read
multiple tags at the same time, which allows manufacturers to
individually tag smaller quantities, even individual pill bottles, within a
larger pallet.8 ' This is advantageous when compared to traditional
pedigree systems, which are limited to tracking large shipments, because
it decreases the incentive to substitute counterfeits into the pallet or
subdivide the pallet." Users can also read the information more quickly
than they could with a paper pedigree or even with barcodes that must
be scanned individually."* In addition, some RFID chips are capable of
74. See discussion infra Part II.B.
75. Pub. L. No. 100-293, 1o9 Stat. 95 (1987).
76. Ghosh, supra note 5, at 578 & n.i. This section is largely based on Suchira Ghosh's thorough
treatment of e-pedigree proposals.
77. Id. at 578.
78. E.g., id.
79. Id.
8o. Id. at 591 (citing FED. TRADE COMM'N, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION: APPLICATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERs 3 (2oo5)).
8 I. Id. at 592-
82. Id.
83. Id.
February 2010] 759
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
being "written" on, which would allow the information to be updated
throughout the distribution process."
Despite these benefits, an RFID e-pedigree system is not ready to
be implemented because the cost is not justified in light of privacy and
accuracy concerns. Implementing an RFID system is extremely
expensive, even for major companies, as individual tags can cost
anywhere from $0.20 to $20, and total costs per manufacturer can range
from $9 million to $25 million." For example, a pilot program for Viagra
"cost several million dollars to tag retail packages and cases of the
drug." 86 While the costs may be justifiable to the pharmaceutical
companies because they prevent lost sales for high-profit drugs, less
frequently used drugs and generic drugs may not be counterfeit often
enough to justify the economic cost of the system from a lost-profits
t7perspective.
Despite the enormous costs, legislation can compel drug companies
to use RFID tags. However, Congress should avoid doing so. Increased
costs will force drug manufacturers to produce fewer drugs and sell them
at a greater price, which will prevent many consumers from receiving the
drugs they need. This could drive these consumers straight into the hands
of the counterfeiters by forcing them to buy cheaper drugs from more
risky sources." Additionally, the cost to bring drugs to the market is so
extreme that there are already few incentives to research treatment for
very rare diseases.8 9 Increasing the costs even more by requiring an RFID
system for these drugs may prevent life-saving research.
Alternatively, legislation could require RFID tags only for drugs
that are very popular or frequently counterfeited. But, how much risk to
human life is required before forcing a drug manufacturer to implement
a system that could chill research and distribution of the drug?
Furthermore, pharmaceutical counterfeiters are sophisticated criminals.
They can easily shift production to drugs that do not require RFID tags.
In the end, lines would have to constantly be redrawn to alter which
drugs require RFID tags. The result is increased costs that will be passed
on to consumers, a disincentive to research, and little to no assurance of
safety.
Various consumer privacy groups' and government agencies' have
stepped forward to question the privacy implications of RFID use. By
84. Id.
85. Id. at 593-94.
86. Id. at 594.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., discussion supra Part I.B.
89. See David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?,
55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 126-27 (2000).
90. Ohosh, supra note 5, at 596 (citing Spicychips.com: How RFID will Compromise Privacy,
Security, Freedom, http://www.spychips.com/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2oso); Electronic Privacy
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tagging individual pills or bottles, "consumers' whereabouts, tastes,
purchases, and medical information" may be tracked.9 2 While these
concerns should not be ignored, one simple solution to this particular
problem is deactivating the RFID chip after a consumer purchases the
drug via a "kill" command."
However, more alarmingly, recent tests indicate that data from
RFID chips may not be accurate because the system has a high failure
rate and is susceptible to tampering. While the technology has made
significant improvements, a study by Cardinal Health found that twenty-
seven percent of the RFID tags were unreadable.94 Supporters of RFID
pharmaceutical tracking point to the successful implementation of similar
RFID applications ranging from toll payment and passports, to U.S.
Postal Service and military shipments.95 Unfortunately, hackers have
demonstrated that many of these systems are susceptible to tampering.
For example, the San Francisco Bay Area's "FasTrak" system uses an
RFID chip that a security researcher easily read and reprogrammed."
Even more disturbing, using a $250 RFID reader and an antenna
connected to a laptop, a researcher drove around San Francisco and
cloned two U.S. citizens' passports in just twenty minutes. Both of these
examples involve misappropriation of and tampering with data stored on
RFID tags that are not in possession of a criminal. The process becomes
much easier when the criminal is a pharmaceutical counterfeiter who is
in the possession of the RFID chips and has the time, resources, and
incentive to alter data. This is even more problematic when using RFID
chips that can store data because a counterfeiter could adjust the
quantity or relabel the concentration on the RFID chip itself.
The other medium for e-pedigree is either one-dimensional or two-
dimensional bar codes.'" The main advantage of using barcodes instead
Information Center, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems, http://www.epic.org/privacy/
rfid/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2010)).
91. Id. (citing U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILTY OFFICE, GAO-o5-55I, INFORMATION SECURITY RADIO
FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 18 (2005)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Liang, supra note 29, at 304; Robert P. Giacalone, Drug Wholesaling and Importation:
Challenges and Opportunities, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 65, 72-73 (2005).
95. Ghosh, supra note 5, at 592.
96. Posting of Eliot Phillips to Hack a Day, Black Hat 2008: Fastrak Toll System Completely
Broken (Aug. 6 2oo8, 3:50 pm), http://hackaday.cOm/2oo8/o8/o6/black-hat-2008-fastrak-toll-system-
completely-broken/. Nate Lawson is a security researcher who presented a variety of security and
technical problems in the FasTrak system at the annual Black Hat Conference. Id. Black Hat is a
leading conference focusing on information security. Id.
97. Dan Goodin, Passport RFIDs Cloned Wholesale by $250 elay Auction Spree, REGISTER, Feb.
2, 2009, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2oo9/o2/o2/Iow cost rfid cloner/.
98. Ghosh, supra note 5, at 597.
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of RFID tags is cost." Some assert that one disadvantage is that barcodes
are read-only and cannot track the supply chain like a writable RFID tag
can." However, barcodes may be advantageous because at least the
quantity, quality, and type of drug could be permanently recorded in a
database and linked to a bar code.
Overall, the e-pedigree system is a step in the right direction.
However, given the problems associated with the technology, it will take
more work before the cost of RFID chips is justified. Additionally, e-
pedigree systems should not be touted as a panacea. Even if it worked
perfectly and cost nothing to implement, it would still not close every gap
in the supply chain. For this reason, we should continue to develop e-
pedigree systems, but they should not be implemented at this time
because they would only give a false sense of security.
III. BENCHMARK LEGISLATION ADDRESSEs BOTH IMMEDIATE AND
FUTURE NEEDS
The previous Part discussed current legislative debate regarding
counterfeit pharmaceuticals and concluded that neither an e-pedigree
system nor a bill similar to the Dorgan Bill should be implemented at this
time. Part III suggests actions pharmaceutical companies can take to
provide immediate relief and proposes a comprehensive bill that would
be implemented in phases based on objective criteria to provide long-
term relief.
One common theme in current proposals and legislative debate is
that everyone is looking for a quick fix. Various bills purport to be the
universal panacea.'0 ' Many tout RFID technology as the holy grail of
pharmaceutical safety.0 2 The Dorgan Bill was equally intriguing because
it sought to reduce pharmaceutical prices, but also claimed to contain the
cure to safety concerns." Those concerned primarily with the rising cost
of pharmaceuticals cite reimportation as a method of decreasing those
costs.0 4 However, such plans will expose the market to even more safety
risks. E-pedigree enhances safety, but increases costs for manufacturers
and wholesalers.o' The result is a debate about which we should choose:
price over safety, or safety over price.zo6 If done correctly, however, we
will not need to choose at all.
99. Id. at 597-98.
oo. Id.
101. See, e.g, Press Release, Byron Dorgan, supra note 6o: see also, Ghosh, supra note 5, at 590.
102. See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 5, at 591-93.
103. See Press Release, Byron Dorgan, supra note 6o.
104. See discussion supra Part IIA.
105. See Ohosh, supra note 5, at 593.
i o6. See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang, A Dose of Reality: Promoting Access to Pharmaceuticals, 8 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 301, 344-69 (2008).
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The industry needs significant changes that must occur in stages
over time. I propose a series of steps that address immediate concerns
and provide for additional actions as technology evolves and previous
phases take effect. First, pharmaceutical companies should communicate
the danger of counterfeits to consumers. They should also place more
emphasis on trademark protection, which is a stronger deterrent against
counterfeits than patent or copyright. Next, the legislature should pass a
comprehensive bill that is implemented in phases based on objective
benchmarks. The bill should immediately increase criminal penalties and
limit the number of authorized wholesalers. Then, e-pedigree should be
implemented when it has passed tests for reliability and efficiency.
Finally, the bill will reconsider opening up importation after the earlier
stages have taken effect and a corresponding safety benefit is realized.
A. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES PROVIDE THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE
Legislation takes a significant amount of time to be implemented.
Conversely, pharmaceutical companies have relative free-reign to control
marketing and distribution of their products. As a result, the quickest
way to reduce pharmaceutical counterfeiting comes from the
pharmaceutical industry itself. Pharmaceutical companies should
communicate the risk of counterfeits to consumers, stigmatize the
counterfeiters, and adequately protect their intellectual property rights.
The costs of such programs are justified both by protecting the consumer
from dangerous goods and protecting the company's profits and
reputation.
-. Communicating the Risk of Ordering Drugs from Internet
Pharmacies Will Limit the Number of People Who Order Drugs
Online
Counterfeit products are designed to appear, on the surface, to be
the same as a legitimate product." When brand recognition is the goal of
the consumer, as is often the case for purchasers of expensive purses and
sunglasses, the consumer believes he or she is getting a deal by buying a
counterfeit. The nafve consumer will assume that all counterfeits work
the same way and provide the same benefit. Unfortunately, the naive
consumer may not realize that counterfeit pharmaceuticals are unique
and specifically not designed to provide the same effect as the real
product."o
Few studies have been conducted regarding the attitudes of
counterfeit purchasers. One of the few studies to compare counterfeit
pharmaceuticals to other types of counterfeits found that consumers
decided whether to buy a likely counterfeit product based on factors
107. See Konski, supra note i, at 3.
io8. See id.
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inherent to the type of product.'" For Ray Ban sunglasses, product
attributes and shopping environment influenced the purchaser's
decision."0 By contrast, for pharmaceuticals, the potential ill effects of
taking the counterfeit drug influenced the decision whether or not to
purchase the drug."' While this study indicates that consumers are aware
of safety when buying pharmaceuticals, the study was conducted on
graduate students who were told to assume they knew the product was
counterfeit."' The situation may be much different for budget-conscious
shoppers and people who believe the product might not be counterfeit."3
Such consumers may be more willing to take a risk if they believe that
risk is small and they can save a significant amount of money.
The study further found that stigmatizing counterfeiting also
reduced the likelihood that a consumer would purchase a counterfeit."'
For this reason, highlighting the illegal nature and danger of counterfeit
pharmaceuticals may decrease consumers' willingness to buy from risky
sources."5  One such example was when the Heinz Corporation
Tz6
confronted significant counterfeiting of their products in China. Heinz
encouraged law enforcement to conduct raids and brought reporters to
publicize the event."' The campaign was highly successful and eliminated
all of Heinz's serious counterfeiting problems."
In these challenging economic times, consumers will do whatever
they can to cut costs, and for many that includes turning to internet
pharmacies for their prescription drugs. While some propose shutting
down nearly all internet pharmacies,"' doing so would be impractical.
However, communicating risks to consumers is entirely within the
1o9. Robert C. Bird, Counterfeit Drugs: A Global Consumer Perspective. 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 387,390-91 (2008).
ilo. Id. (citing Birgit Leisen & Alexander Nill, Combating Product Counterfeiting: An
Investigation into the Likely Effectiveness of a Demand-Oriented Approach. I 2 MARKETING THEORY &
APPLICATIONS 271, 275 (200)). Subjects were to imagine they were shopping in a store in Mexico and
had been told by a reliable source that the store only sold counterfeit products. Id. at 391 n.29. The
subjects were asked about their willingness to purchase Ray Ban sunglasses, Rolex watches, and a
small white bottle with a red cap and a TYLENOL label that cost one dollar. Id.
IIi. Id. at 391.
112. Id. at 391 & n.29.
113. "Education level correlates positively with the purchase of counterfeit literature and software,
but negatively with the purchase of fashion-related items such as leather products and watches." Id. at
394 (citing Chow-Hou Wee et al., Non-Price Determinants of Intention to Purchase Counterfeit Goods,
12 INT'L MARKETING REV. 19, 39-40 (1995)).
114. Id. (citing Wee et al., supra note 113, at 40).
I15. Id. at 396-98.
I 16. Id. at 403-04.
117. Id. (citing John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, Swashbuckling the Pirates: A
Communications-Blased Approach to IPR Protection in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW AND PRACTICE 409, 426 ('999)).
118. Id. at 404.
119. See, eg., Liang, supra note xo6, at 370.
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pharmaceutical industry's control. By educating consumers about the
dangers of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical companies may
be able to convince consumers to purchase drugs from a more reliable
source.
Professor Bryan Liang advocates for a broad federal statute that will
provide a no-cost or low-cost drug program, registered wholesalers, a
prohibition on internet pharmacies, public education, and enhanced
criminal penalties.'20 One of his central arguments is that the most
vulnerable consumers are those with low income looking to cut prices,
and that by providing a no-cost or low-cost drug program, those
consumers will be less likely to buy drugs from high-risk sources.' 2 While
Professor Liang's proposal sounds good on paper, it would require too
much time and expense to implement. Additionally, it assumes that the
myriad internet pharmacies can be shut down. In essence, Professor
Liang's premise is the same as mine-low income consumers looking to
cut costs are the most vulnerable and likely to order drugs from high-risk
sources-but his proposal is more bloated than necessary. While
arguably not as effective as Professor Liang's proposal, pharmaceutical
companies have the potential to immediately decrease the number of
consumers willing to order from high-risk sources such as internet
pharmacies.
2. Properly Protecting Traditional Intellectual Property Rights Will
Provide Stiffer Penalties and Greater Deterrence
Traditionally, the first line of defense for pharmaceutical companies
is a portfolio of strong intellectual property rights. Much of the
legislation and criminal sanctions discussed below depend on
pharmaceutical companies adequately protecting their intellectual
property. This provides the company with private redress as well as the
ability to fully utilize government aid and criminal prosecution. Some
forms of intellectual property are uniquely suited for preventing
counterfeit drugs from entering the market.
Antoinette Konski, an expert in global intellectual property
protection, asserts that, while patents are considered the first line of
defense, they are actually less practical at enforcing rights against
counterfeiters than other types of intellectual property protection.12
Patent protection rewards innovation and generally grants the patent
holder a right to exclude others from manufacturing, using, importing,
selling, or offering for sale an exact or close copy of a patented
technology.' However, patent protection is relatively ineffective for
120o. Id.
121. Id. at 374.
122. Konski, supra note 1, at 3.
123. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
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patented drugs because counterfeiters do not copy the active ingredient
and usually replace it with a cheaper ingredient.' 2 4 Additionally, generic
drug manufacturers, who often manufacture drugs after the patent term
expires, have no recourse through the patent system.
By contrast, trademarks seek to protect exactly what counterfeiters
target: brand recognition. For this reason, Konski argues that trademark
protection is the most valuable type of intellectual property that can be
used to combat counterfeiting.126 A pharmaceutical company may obtain
a trademark on the color or shape of pills as well as brand names,
designs, and symbols.'27 This allows pharmaceutical manufacturers,
including generic drug companies, to register and protect all unique
aspects of their products. In contrast to most patent lawsuits, in many
countries the trademark owner can have counterfeit goods, documents,
and equipment immediately seized after bringing suit.' Furthermore, if
a person knowingly infringes a trademark in the process of trafficking
counterfeit drugs, criminal sanctions are increased from a maximum of
three years in prison to a maximum of ten years in prison."' In addition,
obtaining and enforcing trademark rights is typically much less costly and
time-consuming than patent prosecution and infringement actions. 30 This
unique combination makes trademarks particularly well suited as a first
line of defense for drug manufacturers.
Copyrights only protect works of authorship such as literary,
musical, dramatic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, cinematic, and
architectural works.' 3' As a result, only package inserts may be protected
and are of little use in preventing the drug from reaching the public.' 2 In
the world of counterfeit drugs, that amounts to virtually no protection.
Thus, in addition to educating customers, pharmaceutical companies can
best protect their intellectual property and ensure maximum
punishments for criminals by maintaining strong trademarks.
B. USING OBJECTIVE CRITERIA TO CREATE A MULTI-STEP LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION
The previous section discussed why pharmaceutical companies are
more capable than Congress of providing immediate relief from the
threat of counterfeit drugs. However, the benefits provided by the
124. Konski, supra note x, at 3.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id.
128. Id.
329. See supra note 53.
130. Id.*
131. 17 U.S.C. § 3o2(a) (2006).
332. Konski, supra note i, at 4.
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pharmaceutical industry are limited, and the bulk of relief must occur at
the legislative level. This section proposes a comprehensive bill designed
to attack counterfeiters systematically, in stages, as technology advances
and the pharmaceutical supply line is secured.
Legislators are inclined to act, but proper care must be taken to
ensure that those actions do not cause more harm than good. Ideas
without action do nothing to solve a problem and only confuse the issue.
However, implementing programs that are not ready have the potential
to waste time and money, as well as actually cause harm. As discussed
above, implementing an e-pedigree system will essentially waste money'33
and implementing legislation similar to the Dorgan Bill has the potential
to cause greater harm.'3 4
As discussed above, legislation should not consider reimportation
until adequate safety measures have been implemented. Unfortunately,
e-pedigree is not currently ready to be implemented and at this point
may overcomplicate the system. For these reasons, legislation should be
implemented which sets goals that must be reached before taking the
next step in the fight against counterfeiters. This approach ensures that
legislation is not implemented prematurely.
The goal of such legislation has both judicial and regulatory prongs.
The judicial prong involves effective deterrence through criminal
penalties. However, because of the difficulties in apprehending
pharmaceutical counterfeiters,"' it is questionable whether increased
criminal sanctions will have any effect. From the regulatory perspective,
the goal is to package and ship pharmaceuticals in a way that prevents
criminals from importing counterfeits into the country. In this respect,
limiting the number of wholesalers authorized to import pharmaceuticals
into the United States will result in an immediate benefit, and, when the
technology is ready, the e-pedigree system will provide additional help.
Such a comprehensive bill would provide immediate relief, assure future
benefits as technology advances, and prevent harm from premature
implementation of programs that are not ready. The individual portions
of the bill are discussed below in turn.
i. Legislation Should Occur Primarily at the Federal Level
Whether fake pharmaceuticals should be addressed at the state or
federal level is open to serious debate. In many situations, federal control
may be preferred because it provides a universal standard that can be
relied upon by manufacturers and distributors. Because counterfeiting is
a national problem originating out of counterfeits that are imported from
133. See discussion supra Part IB.
134. See discussion supra Part IIA.
135. See supra notes 445 and accompanying text.
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sanctions should include life imprisonment, forfeiture of all assets, and
treble damages or, at a minimum, should match those of illicit drugs.'43
Others argue that criminal punishment should only apply to those who
endanger the lives of others in order to profit by counterfeiting.' In this
way, resources would not be wasted prosecuting less dangerous
counterfeiters.145
Taking away a tool of law enforcement with the hope that
enforcement will be directed to more dangerous counterfeiting may not
be the best solution. A better solution is to leave current counterfeit
statutes in place,'46 add additional statutory penalties for dangerous
counterfeiting, and work with law enforcement to ensure that dangerous
counterfeiting is given a higher priority. Given that criminal
counterfeiters are killing innocent people, often children,'47 I would
advocate for extremely severe penalties. However, the degree of criminal
punishment relevant to the crime is a debate that is outside the scope of
this Note and better addressed by experts in the field of criminal justice.
To send an adequate deterrent message, however, penalties should at
least mirror the penalties for distributing illicit drugs, such as cocaine, in
order to prevent illicit drug dealers from moving to the less risky business
of pharmaceutical counterfeiting.148
While increasing criminal penalties will hopefully have some
deterrent effect, it may be ineffective because the possibility of being
caught is still relatively low.149 Accordingly, it may be prudent to include
a provision that calls for the re-evaluation of increased criminal penalties
at a later date to determine if such increases have actually been effective.
If Congress determines that increased prosecutorial efforts are proving
futile, those resources can be redirected to an area where more benefit
will be realized.
3. Immediate Regulatory Relief Limiting the Number of
Wholesalers
The "gray market" creates extensive holes in the supply chain that
allow criminals to infiltrate the chain.' 0 It is easy to infiltrate the supply
chain because, while three large companies control ninety percent of the
wholesaling market, the other ten percent is controlled by a large
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 433, 451 (2oo8).
143. E.g., Liang, supra note 29, at 314.
144. Rierson, supra note 142.
145. Id.
146. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2oo6).
147. See Bogdanich & Hooker. supra note 2, at 24.
148. See Liang, supra note 29. at 286.
149. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
15o. See discussion supra Part I.B..
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number of small wholesalers."' Professor Liang suggests that one way to
exercise control is to prohibit unregistered wholesalers.' Unfortunately,
current state policies are not discriminating enough and a number of
convicted felons were able to obtain state licenses to distribute medicine,
which they used to sell counterfeit drugs.' The requirements should go
one step further and limit the number of licenses to an amount that can
be adequately controlled and policed, even if that limits wholesalers to
"the big three" for the time being. While this raises concerns of a quasi-
monopoly between three companies, our first priority should be
safeguarding a drug supply line that is currently peppered with security
risks that seriously injure or kill people daily.
Implementing stricter requirements for wholesalers may have the
immediate impact of severely limiting the number of wholesalers in order
to adequately control the supply line. Such a restriction is justified
presently because of the immediate health threat. However, when extra
safety measures are implemented to control the supply chain, limiting the
number of competitors will be unnecessary and it will drive prices up.
For this reason, this portion of the legislation should have a sunset clause
to limit or eventually eliminate the restrictions over time as other safety
measures are implemented.
4. The Next Step: E-Pedigree
As previously discussed, the e-pedigree system is not currently
ready to be implemented.'54 Concerns over cost, safety, and security
prevent the system from being beneficial in the near future. However,
the idea is sound and should be implemented when technology has
increased to a point where it can be reliably implemented at an
affordable cost. The above actions by pharmaceutical companies and
proposed legislation would reduce the immediate threat and, when e-
pedigree is truly ready, counterfeiting may be eliminated at least in the
U.S. market.
Previous bills have set arbitrary timelines for when the system
should be implemented.' While these concrete deadlines may be
comforting to some, they may force action when the system is not ready,
unnecessarily driving up costs without providing any tangible benefit., 6
For that reason, the proposed bill should include limitations that the e-
151. See discussion supra Part I.B.i.
152. Liang, supra note xo6, at 370.
153. See Bob LaMendola & Sally Kestin, Former Convicts Try a Safer Venture: Pharmaceuticals,
SUN SENTINEL (Florida), May 26, 2003, at iA (noting numerous cases of convicted felons who obtained
state licenses to distribute medications and subsequently sold counterfeit drugs).
554. See discussion supra Part 1.8.
155 Ghosh, supra note 5, at 595.
s56. See discussion supra Part II.B.
[Vol. 61:749770
A MEASURED APPROACH
pedigree system will be implemented only after the system achieves
reliability and affordability standards set by the FDA.
5. Finally, Savings Without Sacrificing Safety
Legislation similar to the Dorgan Bill has the potential to provide
real cost savings to consumers. The bill could allow consumers to import
drugs from other countries that have cheaper prices as a result of foreign
government price controls and free trade. Unfortunately, because of the
current security holes in the pharmaceutical chain, implementing such a
bill now would force us to choose consumer savings at the expense of
further counterfeiting problems and the health risks associated with
counterfeiting.5 Accordingly, the legislation should include provisions to
reconsider re-importation plans after the above portions of the Bill have
gone into effect and have provided a corresponding safety benefit.
CONCLUSION
This Note has outlined the dangers of counterfeit pharmaceuticals
and why current legislative proposals will fail. Instead, I propose a new
plan of attack against counterfeiters to reduce the real, tangible risk to
anyone who consumes pharmaceuticals. The proposal includes
immediate efforts by the pharmaceutical industry and comprehensive
legislation that is implemented in several stages based on objective
benchmarks. The goal is to provide immediate relief and, eventually, the
panacea everyone is searching for.
By creating such "benchmark" legislation, the immediate concerns
can be addressed quickly while allowing time for more all-encompassing
solutions to develop. Critics may claim this proposal is only putting a
bandage on the problem, in hope of curing it at a later date when
technology advances. That is true. But when it comes to medicine, it is
better to take some positive steps than to continue to gamble with this
country's medical supplies while scholars debate the finer points of
panaceas.
157. See supra note io6 and accompanying text.
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